The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of motivational orientations on negotiation outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. Instability was created by 
Individual Outcome
We will now turn to how joint outcome is divided between negotiators in the same dyad, beginning with the homogeneous dyads. In general, we expect information to be an advantage in negotiations, as knowledge about the motivational orientation of the other party reduces uncertainty. Consequently, the informed negotiators can adjust their behavior to their expectations about the other parties, and thereby further their own goal whether it is to maximize only their own gain or also the gain of the other party. We must keep in mind that cooperative negotiators are neither altruistic nor only concerned with the dyadic level outcomes. For example, cooperators that have been informed about the opponents' cooperative orientation may use this knowledge in the final phase of the negotiation in order to claim a larger part of the pie. They do not expect the demands to jeopardize a settlement, since the opponent is a cooperator. The informed individualists who meet uninformed individualists can use the information advantage to set extra high opening offers and concede slowly. 
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In the mixed dyads we expect agreements that favour the informed individualists. The uninformed cooperators will, at least initially, be considerate and employ integrative tactics. This put the informed individualists in a position to exploit the cooperative negotiators with distributive behavior. An advantage for the individualists can also be found in the closing phase of the negotiation. Here the cooperators may be willing to (unilaterally) concede in order to secure an agreement that may seem to be at risk. However, when the cooperators have the information advantage, they can guard against exploitation. In summary, we therefore propose the following hypothesis regarding distribution of values between negotiators in mixed dyads:
Hypothesis 4: Individualists get higher individual outcomes than their cooperative opponents, but only when they have the information advantage.
Method Participants
A total of 162 business students enrolled in negotiation courses served as subjects in this study. Their average age was 25 years, and women composed 43 percent of the sample. The participants received a cooperative or an individualistic orientation, and were paired with a cooperative or an individualistic opponent. In each dyad, one of the parties received information about the motivational orientation of their opponent. The participants were randomly assigned to orientation condition, information condition, and role (buyer or seller), and conditions and roles were fully counterbalanced.
Procedures
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The negotiation task was a buyer-seller interaction about the delivery of television sets (cf. Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) . Three issues had to be negotiated; the date of delivery, product variations, and financing terms. Each issue had nine alternative settlement points. The total payoff-matrix is shown in table 1. We chose this simulation because it is a commonly used variable-sum negotiation that allows for integrative agreements through logrolling. The parties could achieve high quality agreements by exchanging concession on their low-profit issues. The negotiation was conducted during the first meeting of the classes. Each student was assigned the role of buyer or seller, and received confidential role information. The confidential role information contained background information, manipulation instructions, and a profit matrix that showed the negotiators their individual profit associated with the different possible alternatives. After preparing individually for 10 minutes, the participants were assigned to dyads (a seller and a buyer) and led to separate rooms. The dyads were given 30 minutes to negotiate. Following the negotiation, the participants completed questionnaires regarding motivational orientations, perceived negotiation quality, and the negotiation process. Finally, the participants were debriefed.
Manipulations
Orientation. Following previous research on motivational orientation in negotiation (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1993) , individualistic and cooperative orientations were manipulated through written instructions. The manipulations were presented as instructions from management. In the individualistic condition, the subjects read that their primary goal was to maximize own outcome. In the cooperative condition, the participants read that their primary goal was to maximize their own and the total outcome for the two companies. 1 1 Twenty-one of the participants' orientations were different from the ones given in the instruction. When we excluded these participants, and their dyads, and two dyads with an impasse, the total number of dyads in the primary analyses were 60 (21 cooperative, 15 individualistic, 13 mixed with informed cooperators, and 11 mixed with informed individualists). Secondary analyses including all participants showed similar result as in the primary analyses, but the effects of composition on joint outcome and integrative activities dropped to non-significance (F-values ≈ 1.5, p-values ≈ 0.20) . Drop-out rate did not interact with conditions (composition and own position within composition). Neither had the dropped cases "weaker" orientation than other participants, as we found no differences between Information. In the post-negotiation questionnaire the participants were also asked to indicate which expectations they had about the opponent's orientation before the negotiation started. The alternatives they had to choose from were the same as in the orientation check above. The factual information about the orientation of the opponents were accurately perceived, χ 2 (1, n = 60) = 20.71, p < .0001. Those informed about an individualistic opponent were more likely to expect an individualistic opponent, while those informed about a cooperative opponent were more likely to expect a cooperative opponent.
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Dyadic Outcomes
We first compared the joint outcomes in the four dyadic compositions. Means Planned pair comparisons showed that both the two former compositions differed significantly from both of the two latter (p-values ≤ .05). Second, we compared perceived negotiation quality in the four compositions (see table 2 ). Composition also had a significant impact on the perceived quality, F (1, 54) = 4.24, p < .01. The cooperative dyads (M = 3.83) and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators (M = 3.88) had higher perceived quality than the individualistic dyads (M = 3.53) and the participants with correct and wrong orientation on a question measuring the degree to which the participants tried to fulfil their primary objective.
2 Thirteen participants did not report the correct orientation of their opponent. Most of them were those informed about a cooperative opponent. In each condition, we compared these dyads with the other dyads, and found no differences. Analyses showed that the results were almost exactly the same whether the dyads of these members were included or not. We therefore included these dyads in the primary analyses.
mixed dyads with informed individualists (M = 3.53). Again, the planned pair comparisons showed significant differences where both the two former compositions differed from both of the two latter (p-values ≤ .05).
The results support our dyadic level hypotheses. With asymmetry in information, the cooperative dyads reach higher outcomes than the individualistic dyads (Hypothesis 1). The mixed dyads with informed cooperators reach higher outcomes than the individualistic dyads (Hypothesis 2a), the mixed dyads with informed individualists reach lower outcomes than the cooperative dyads (Hypothesis 2b), and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators reach higher outcomes than the mixed dyads with informed individualists (Hypothesis 2c). These results hold for both joint outcome and perceived negotiation quality.
Negotiation Process
We examined the negotiation process in order to explore the micro-mediating process between dyadic compositions and outcomes. First, we examined how the composition affected the integrative and the distributive activities, respectively. quality. Distributive activities did not impact outcomes significantly. When we analysed each phase separately, we found that integrative activities are more important in the latter rather than in the earlier phases of negotiation. Regarding distributive negotiation activities, we found that high level in the final phase led to low perceived negotiation quality. Finally, we also examined whether the relationship between the process and joint outcome varied across compositions, but found no differences.
Individual Outcome
In each composition we compared individual outcome for the informed party with that of the uninformed opponent. A high intraclass correlation (-0.49) between these scores made comparison by analysis of variance inappropriate. A high negative intraclass correlation (Kenny & La Voie, 1985) indicates that a high individual outcome for one member goes along with low individual outcome for the other member. The observations are thus not independent of each other, and the results from the analysis of variance are questionable (Hoyle & Crawford, 1994) . We therefore conducted difference analyses by subtracting, in each dyad, the individual score of the uninformed member from the score of the informed member. By using difference analyses the dependence problem is avoided, however at the cost of reducing the degrees of freedom. Table 4 shows means and standard deviations for the individual outcome across conditions. We first examined how the information asymmetry affected individual outcome in homogeneous dyads (cooperative and individualistic dyads, respectively). A one-sample t-test with a test-value of zero showed no significant differences between the informed and the uninformed negotiators, neither in the cooperative dyads, t (20) = 0.20, ns, nor in the individualistic dyads, t (14) = 0.12, ns.
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However, in the mixed dyads with informed individualists, individualists got substantial higher individual outcome (M = 5318) than what their cooperative opponents achieved (M = 3718). Thus, the individualists obtained almost 60 percent of the total pie. A difference analysis showed this difference to be significant, t (10) = 3.71, p < .01. In the mixed dyads with informed cooperators, the individualists also achieved higher individual outcomes (M = 5277) than their cooperative opponents (M = 4546), but this difference was not significant, t (12) = -1.64, ns.
The results do not support Hypothesis 3 which suggested an information advantage in homogeneous dyads. However, the results support our Hypothesis 4 which stated that individualists will reach higher individual outcomes than what their cooperative opponents achieve, but only when they have the information advantage.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of motivational orientation on Thus, mixed dyads seem to converge towards cooperation or competition depending upon who has the information advantage. It is worth noting that the major differences seem to be related to integrative activities in the later phases of the negotiations. The cooperative dyads and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators increased the integrative activities over time, the other dyads did not. Thus, it is not the initial integrative activities or the distributive activities that distinguishes between the different dyadic compositions.
It seems that the informed cooperators in mixed dyads are able to guard against exploitation, and that the individualists must participate in integrative activities in order to increase own gain. In the mixed dyads with informed individualists, the individualists seem to increase own gain by exploiting the cooperators. This is confirmed by our individual level analyses. We only found unbalanced distribution of values in the mixed dyads with informed individualists.
Here the individualists exploited the naive cooperators.
Implications
The findings in this study have several implications regarding the effects of motivational orientation. Previous research has found motivational orientation to affect negotiation processes and outcomes in predictable ways when we have stable negotiation contexts. The present study shows that motivational orientation also influence outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. We included a perceptual measure of negotiation quality in this study. Given the importance of perception for the aftermath of negotiations, it is important to know if perceptual and objective measures of outcomes are positively interrelated. After negotiations, participants will not always in detail know the objective quality of their agreements. Negotiators must then rely on perceptual indicators of quality. In addition to substitute for objective indicators of quality, perceived negotiation quality is important because it may influence the implementation of negotiated agreements and also future negotiations between the parties. In our study, perceived negotiation quality was positively related to joint outcome, and had the same causes. This result suggests that negotiators may trust their perceptions when evaluating negotiations.
Future studies should, however, use more fine-grained measures of perceived negotiation quality. They should also use other negotiation tasks than the relatively simple simulation used here.
Our results regarding the negotiation phases support the importance of examining processes over time (Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996) . Interestingly, in our study orientation and information did not affect the initial negotiation phase, but were influential in the final phase. This result is in harmony with De Dreu & Van Lange (1995). They found no differences in demands and concessions between cooperators and individualists in the first two rounds of a negotiation simulation, but found that differences developed over time. Thus, further research should explore whether in fact the critical impact of orientations comes in the later phases of negotiations, rather than in the early ones.
The results from the process analyses suggest that it is more important to get an increase in integrative activities over time, rather than to hinder distributive activities. Distributive activities only had a weak negative effect on the outcomes, while integrative activities had a considerable positive effect on both joint outcome and perceived negotiation quality. Further studies should, however, investigate which factors that contribute to integrative activities and which factors that reduce the likelihood of distributive activities in negotiations. The factors may not be the same, and knowledge about them may have interesting implications for advicing negotiators on how to manage the negotiation process.
The limitations of this study should also have implications for future research.
For example, the study should be replicated on different samples and in different negotiation situations, as using students in controlled settings have its limitations. In We also suggest the negotiation process to be examined in more detail (cf.
Olekalns & Smith, 1999). In our exploratory analyses on process we used subjective and retrospective data to capture integrative and distributive activities. Perceptual data may, however, inaccurately reflect actual behavior. It is therefore preferable to code transcripts from the negotiations, based on well developed coding schemes and procedures. Although our study is parsimonious in its dynamic analyses, it is based on relatively broad measures and on perceptual rather than objective data about the negotiation process.
Finally, the present research has potential practical implications. The most salient implication is for the naive cooperators. The uninformed cooperators meeting informed individualists face the risk of being exploited. Thus having a reputation of having a cooperative orientation may be a two-edged sword. The cooperators must safeguard themselves against exploitation by actively trying to acquire knowledge about the opponents' goals both before and during the initial phase of negotiations.
This can be achieved through consultations with people familiar with the other party, and through active listening in the negotiation (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993 Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p ≤ .05 for joint outcome, perceived quality, and distributive activities, and at p ≤ .10 for integrative activities.
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